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A Primer on Fundamental
Corporate Changes*
Norman D. Lattin
FROM THrE FIRST beginnings of the business corporation formed
under general legislative acts, rigid concepts of contract, property
and constitutional interdiction which had reached partial or complete fruition in their own limited fields and which had found
expression in cases involving the early corporation created by
legislative act or executive grant, were accepted and further developed. In the realm of major corporate alterations, this was
particularly true. Trouble came from two chief sources. The first
was an analogy derived from a rule of partnership law which
required unanimous action of the partners to alter the contract of
partnership.1 The second came from the famous and still frequently
cited case of Trustees -of
PROFESSOR LATTIN

(A.B. 1918, Colby Col-

lege; J.D. 1924, University of Michigan;
S.J.D. 1931, Harvard University) is a Professor of Law at Western Reserve University
School of Law. He is co-author (with Professor Henry W. Ballantine) of CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

(1939); author of CASES

AND MATERIALS ON

(1947); author of titles "Homicide"
and "Sales" in Ohio Jurisprudence; contributor of various articles in legal periodicals.
SALES

Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,' which established t h e doctrine
that the corporate charter constitutes between
the state and the corporation a contract which
is protected by the impairment-o f-t h e-obligation-o f-contracts clause
of the Federal Constitution.

The corporation involved in that famous case was an eleemosynary educational one which had been formed by a grant of the King
*WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1947) defines "primer"
as "A book, originally a prayer book, used in teaching children to read or spell;
hence, an elementary textbook." The object in writing this article is to simplify,
as far as is possible in a limited space, this difficult and confusing field so that
students may be able to grapple with their casebook problems more adequately
than in the past, and that lawyers who have not learned their way around in
this portion of the law may find some aid in a simplified statement. There is
need for much more of this attempt at simplification, even if not entirely adequate, in all branches of the law. As to the "prayer book", there is also some
need for prayer on behalf of some bewildered judges who have added to the
confusion because of a lack of comprehension of the basic principles in this
realm. This is also offered as a supplication to them. No attempt has been
made to document this article more than was necessary to cover the high spots.
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in 1769 when New Hampshire was a colony of Britain. The New
Hampshire legislature passed three acts to amend the corporate
charter. The most important of these was enacted in 1816. Among
other things, it increased the number of trustees from twelve to
twenty-one and created a board of overseers of twenty-five persons
with power to inspect and to control the acts of the trustees. The
appointment of the additional trustees was to be by the governor,
and the board of overseers was to be composed of the governor,
his council and twenty-one others appointed by him. The effect,
of course, was to take from the original trustees and their successors, who, under the King's grant, were empowered to fill all
vacancies within their own body, the authority which had been
vested in them and to give to the political authority a control
which, even today, is rarely as complete in the case of state universities.'
The circumstances were unusually attractive for a court to use
its entire arsenal of judicial techniques to save the day for Dartmouth, and analogies of legislative grants of property were among
them. In support of the rule, Mr. Justice Story, who wrote a concurring opinion, in part argued thus: "This language (the court
had quoted from Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U. S.) 87, at
p. 136) is perfectly unambiguous, and was used in reference to a
grant of land by the Governor of a State under a legislative act.
It determines, in the most unequivocal manner, that the grant of
a State is a contract within the clause of the constitution now in
question, and that it implies a contract not to reassume the rights
granted. A fortiori, the doctrine applies to a charter or grant from
the king."' In the process of determining that a grant of corporate
powers was similar, in effect, to a grant of land made by the legislature, the court did not ignore the position of the donors who
had contributed the funds with which Dartmouth College was to
1
The leading case is Natusch v. Irving, 2 Coop. T. Cott 358, 47 Eng. Rep.
1196 (1824), Gow ON PARTNERSHIP, Appendix VI, p. 398. A partnership for
carrying on a life insurance business was formed. Parliament later made it lawful for such a partnership to underwrite marine insurance and a majority of the
partners favored this. Lord Eldon held that unanimous action was necessary to
alter their contract.
24 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819). "This is plainly a contract to which the
donors, the trustees, and the crown (to whose rights and obligations New
Hampshire succeeds) were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuuable consideration." Chief Justice Marshall, at pp. 643-44.
3
As Chief Justice Marshall put it: "The whole power of gQverning the college
is transferred from trustees appointed according to the will of the founder, expressed in the charter, to the executive of New Hampshire." Id. at 652.
4
1d. at 682-83.
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be run; in fact, they too were considered "original parties" to this

contract.5 Thus was inferentially infused, if unconsciously, the
suggestion that those who contribute to corporations of a different
stamp--the shareholders of today-have a stake in this contract
with the state which comes within the protection of the Constitution.
The police power, that ever pervading force kept in reserve to
further whatever changing policy requires, was necessarily excepted
from the application of the impairment-of-contract principle.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the main opinion,
suggested that the contract bound the crown in a manner not
permitting "violent alteration in its essential terms" 6-an idea
which, in somewhat different forms of expression, turned up later
to aid (not measurably it is true) the extension of corporate powers
not yet authorized by statute when less than all shareholders were
agreeable to the contemplated change. This was some concession,
at least, and certainly an innovation if looked at from the rule of
partnership law which required unanimous action for change of
the partnership articles. As one able writer has stated, "....

It would

astonish the bar to be told that one who signs articles of partnership
impliedly agrees that the majority of his associates may amend
without his consent provided that the amendments are not fundamental in character." 7 But the court in the Dartmouth College
case was not thinking in terms of business corporations operating
under articles of incorporaton which incorporators could file and
thereby accomplish corporateness upon formal compliance with
a statute. Nor did it have in mind shareholders and their contracts, whatever they might be. Its problem was a narrower one.
It was thinking of a grant-a gift-by the crown of powers to be
a body corporate and to carry on as an educational institution in
the manner there provided without interference by the state except
where the police power warranted interference or where "violent
alterations" in the "essential terms" of the grant were not attempted.
The decision itself had far reaching implidations, demonstrating dearly the dangers apparent if reservations were not made
by the state at the time of incorporation. Mr. Justice Story pointed
to a solution in these words: "When a private eleemosynary cor5

See note 2 supra.
1d. at 651.
7E. Merrick Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters,
75 U. op PA. L. R.v. 585, 589 (1927).
6
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poration is thus created by the charter of the crown, it is subject
to no other control on the part of the crown, than what is expressly or implicitly reserved by the charter itself. Unless a power
be reserved for this purpose, the crown cannot, in virtue of its
prerogative, without the consent of the corporation, alter or amend
the charter, or divest the corporation of any of its franchises, or
add to them, or add to, or diminish, the number of the trustees,
or remove any of the members, or change, or control the administration of the charity, or compel the corporation to receive a new
charter. This is the uniform language of the authorities, and forms
one of the most stubborn, and well-settled doctrines of the common
law."' Though such reservations to amend had been made in some
charters prior to the time of this decision, 9 they were not common.
The impact of the decision resulted in the placing of clauses reserving the right to amend and repeal in charters of corporations
created by legislative grant and presently the placing of similar
clauses in constitutions or statutes. 10
From the simple statement by Mr. Justice Story, anyone but a
lawyer steeped in the folklore of judicial opinion might have
assumed that the major problems of corporate change were over,
provided his dictum should be followed.
Our layman who had read Story's opinion might have argued
something like this: Once the charter or the constitution or
statute provides that the state may amend or repeal charters or
the law under which corporateness is derived, this becomes a part
of the contract of the corporation with the state and, necessarily,
with the shareholders who are in reality the corporation. Since
the legislature might have used its police power before the Dartmouth College case, the court must have meant that a reservation
of the power to amend or repeal would permit change which formerly could not be made because of the impairment-of-contracts
clause. Such power to change, our layman might well conclude,
may also have reference to the shareholders themselves and their
contracts for, in reality, they are the corporation-the corporate
personality being created for quite different purposes, chiefly for
convenience in carrying on business in this form. Thus, if a statute
gives a majority or some other proportion of the shareholders, or
of the voting shareholders, authority to make fundamental changes
8
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518,
675 (1819).
9
Dodd, supra note 7, at 592.
10
0H10 CONsT. Art. XIII, § 2 (1851): "Corporations may be formed under
general laws; but all such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed."
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in the business or in the contracts of the shareholder with his company (which is in reality himself and his fellow shareholders) any
court should hold that, they having agreed to this by purchasing
stock in a company already subject to change, consented in advance
to whatever authorized change came later.
Our layman, if informed on property law, might add that
there may be cases where a contract right has somehow or other
obtained the status of a property right (as in the case of a dividend
declared out of a proper surplus) which the shareholder's limited
consent did not cover and that, consequently, a further consent
would be necessary to divest him of this interest. His lawyer would
tell the shareholder that his property right could not be divested
without due process of law and would cite another constitutional
provision to this effect. And our layman, if posed with a problem
involving material change in a corporation having several classes
of stock, whether that change related to one in corporate purposes,
or of capital structure, or of relative rights between shareholders,
would no doubt answer that the analysis above is the only practical
way of taking care of the multitude of interests involved. If
pressed with hypothetical cases he might place some restrictions
upon what changes could be made without unanimous consent,
perhaps insisting upon a showing that the circumstances be such as
to indicate that the change was necessary or advisable and made
in good faith, that sacrifices to be incurred must be equally borne
by all, that is be fair; and, if he knew of modem appraisal statutes,
he might even venture an opinion that these were meant to give
those shareholders who were disgruntled the value of their shares
without impeding the remaining shareholders in carrying on
thereafter.
What actually happened after Mr. Justice Story's dictum had
become incorporated into state constitutions or statutes cannot be
stated with the clarity desirable in a matter of such practical
importance. There was at first a struggle with the basic problem
of whether the reservation to amend or repeal should be confined
to changes in which the state had a vital interest-this looks like
an exercise of the police power-and the usual manner of statement referred to such changes as being ones made in the contract
between the state and the corporation. This, of course, was in line
with the direct holding in the Dartmouth College case.:" There
"'See the leading case of Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., 18 NJ.

Eq. 178 (1867). The Ohio court has recently quoted with apparent approval

the following from 13

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA

CORP'ORATIONS §

5776, p. 86

(Perm. ed. 1943): "The true view is that the power to alter, amend or re-
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were, it should be added, many decisions postdating that case which
described corporate charters as constituting contracts between the
state and the corporation, between the corporation and its shareholders, and between the shareholders inter sese." If the view
is taken that the power to amend extends only to the contract
between the state and the corporation, or, in words of a leading
case accepting this view, that "neither the words nor the circumstances, nor apparent objects for which this provision was made,
can, by any fair construction, extend it to giving a power to one
part of the corporators as against the other, which they did not
have before," 13 the question immediately arises as to the possible
limits of the power. If this is a "reservation to the state, for the
benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state only," 14 it might
well be argued that many important contractual rights of shareholders with the corporation and among themselves, given a proper
setting, become vested with a public interest in which the state is
concerned.' 5 Thus, it might be possible, on the facts of a given
case, to see a public interest though the legislation purports to interfere with, or permits some named proportion of the shareholders
to act in a manner which interferes with contract rights of vital
personal interest. Naturally, no complaint can be made to changes
large or small which were specifically authorized at the time of the
formation of the corporation, for these provisions definitely became
a part of each shareholder's contract with his company.
On the other hand, while it was no doubt true that the power
to amend or repeal corporate charters was not reserved by the
state for the purpose of abolishing the necessity for unanimous
peal charters is reserved by the state 'solely' for the purpose of avoiding the
effect of the decision in the Dartmouth College case ... that the charter of a
corporation is a contract between the state and the corporation within the
constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts,
and that the purpose of the reservation is to enable the state to impose such
restraints upon corporations as the Legislature may deem advisable for protection of the public. Such power is not reserved in any sense for the benefit of
the corporation, or of a majority of the stockholders, upon any idea that the
Legislature can alter the contract between the corporation and its stockholders,

nor for the purpose of enabling it to do so." Matthias, J., in Wheatley v. A. I.

Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 142-43, 69 N.E.2d 187, 195 (1946).
12 Tyler v. Dane County, Wisconsin, 289 Fed. 843 (D.C., Wis., 1923), writ of
error dismissed, 266 U.S. 637, 45 Sup. Ct. 10 (1924); Morris v. American Public
Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton
Mills, 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912). There is much authority in accord.
13
Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 186 (1867).

14Id. at 185-86.
'SThis is convincingly expressed in Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,
16 Del. Ch. 157, 163-64, 142 Atl. 654, 657 (1928).
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action in case of fundamental corporate changes, a principle based
on the analogy of the rule in partnership law-the rule of Natusch
v. Irvingj6- -, there was nothing to prevent an interpretation in
accord with the lead given in the Dartmouth College case that
there were other contractual rights involved besides those of the
state and the corporation. In fact, Mr. Justice Story in pointing
to a solution did not speak with a definiteness that demonstrated
he was thinking of a remedy for but one of these. Besides, constitional or statutory reservations of the power to amend or repeal
are, under liberal guidance as in other cases, subject to be moulded
to fit circumstances not considered at the time of their promulgation. Fortunately, when the corporation was formed subsequent
to the enactment reserving the power to amend or repeal, the
great majority of the courts considered the reservation of the power
a part of the shareholder's contract.17 And no distinction was made
between legislation which purported to amend directly and that
which gave to a named proportion of the shareholders the right
to do the same. The effect of such holdings was to give flexibility
to a business carried on in the corporate form and to make it pos16
See note 1 supra. "It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College case,
not that in .Aatusch v. Irving, that the change was made. The words limit the
power to that object." Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., 18 NJ. Eq. 178,
186 (1867). But see McNulty v. W. &J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 843, 54 N.Y.S.
2d 253, 261 (1945): "The very essence of the reserved power of the Legislature
is to enable it to change preferential rights of the different classes of stock in a
corporation."
17
The leading authority is Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River R. R., 5
Allen (87 Mass.) 230 (1862). Bigelow, C.J., at pp. 245-46, 246-47, in part, said:
"The real contract into which the stockholder enters with the corporation is,
that he agrees to become a member of an artificial body which is created and
has its existence by virtue of a contract with the legislature, which may be
amended or changed with the consent of the company, ascertained and dedared in the mode pointed out by law. Having, by virtue of the relation which
subsists between himself and the corporation as a holder of shares, assented
to the terms of the original act of incorporation, he cannot be heard to say that
he will not be bound by a vote of the majority of the stockholders accepting an
amendment or alterations of the charter made in pursuance of an express
authority reserved to the legislature, and which by such acceptance has become binding on the corporation ....
"It was urged, as a grave objection against the doctrine above stated, that
it puts the minority of the stockholders of a corporation entirely within the
control of the legislature and a majority of the stockholders, and that there
would be no limit or restraint placed on the exercise of the power, so that
corporations might be diverted to purposes and objects wholly foreign to those
for which they were originally established, and stockholders might be made to
participate against their will in undertakings which they never contemplated
and which they deemed inexpedient or ruinous. If this be so, it is a consequence
of which no stockholder can reasonably complain, because it is a result which
flows from the contract into which he has voluntarily entered."
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sible, when the capital structure was in need of overhauling, to
accomplish this without the unanimous consent of the owners of
the business. While still the owners, the shareholders had impliedly
agreed to the use of the democratic process of rule by the majority
to accomplish in a practical business world what was often difficult and at times impossible.
But the story does not end here, for statutes were not always
explicit on the matter of how far the designated majority might
go in voting changes which were highly fundamental and which,
frequently, did damage to some groups of shareholders without
apparent damage to others. Furthermore, there was in legislation
permitting large corporate change in more specific language the
danger that majorities might use their power to further their own
interests,'" and this happened frequently enough to be the basis
for holdings which placed equitable limitations upon the broad
powers given to majorities." Similar equitable results were reached
in the application of statutes with broad but non-specific provisions
for corporate change by a process of reasoning which denied the
designated majority powers which were not clearly stated or spelled
out."° And occasionally a court, forgetting or ignoring, or perhaps
18"Solution of the problem is further complicated by the fact that any device
the use of which is desirable in proper cases for the elimination of burdensome
preferential rights of preferred stockholders may be used in other cases, without regard to corporate needs and for the sole benefit of the common stockholders." Desmond, J., in Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285
N.Y. 500, 506-07, 35 N.E. 2d 618, 621 (1941).
19See, for example, Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
Rav. 1049 (1931); BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIvATE PROPERTY (1933), c. vii, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, particularly p. 267 et seq.; Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Powers of Majority Stockholders, 30 MIcH. L. Rv. 645 (1932).

20 Good examples from many in the books are Breslav v. New York & Queens
Electric Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N.Y. Supp. 932 (1936),
affd without opinion, 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E. 2d 708 (1937), where the power "to
classify or reclassify any shares" was held not to include the power to make nonredeemable issued shares into redeemable ones, the court in a dictum calling
such rights vested property rights. But see Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E. 2d 618 (1941), where the statutory power
to effect changes in previously authorized shares without par value, including
a classification and reclassification of shares and permitting the altering of
preferences of outstanding shares was held not to include the power to eliminate accrued, undeclared dividends and sinking funds although the court considered such contractual rights were not vested rights. After the statute was
amended so as to permit specifically the elimination of accrued, undeclared
dividends, the court sanctioned retroactive elimination in McNulty v. W. & J.
Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253 (1945).
On the other hand, see Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280
N.W. 688 (1938), where the court permitted, by proper shareholder vote, the
reduction of dividend rate on first preferred shares from 7% to 5%, changing
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not being cognizant of the effect of prior decisions, defined the
shareholder's contract with his company and his fellow shareholders as including only those powers to change which existed in the
charter or by statute at the time he acquired his shares. This added
to the confusion of an already difficult field of law which, if followed to its logical end, would require a tracing of shareholder
status in each individual case in order to make a determination
of what powers then existed.21
While the difficulties up to the present point of discussion were
formidable, a significant misconception cropped up which created
of ratio of net quick assets to the par value of outstanding first preferred from
120% to 60%, reducing the percentage of profits to be set aside annually as a
first preferred sinking fund from 3% to 2%, and increasing the authorized
issue of common shares from 20,000 to 50,000 without giving the present common shareholders their preemptive right, by virtue of a statute providing,
"180.07(1) Any corporation organized for any of the purposes authorized by
this chapter, may, by a vote of two-thirds of all the stock outstanding, and
entitled to vote.., amend its articles so as to modify or enlarge its business or
purposes, change its name or location, increase or diminish its capital stock,
change its officers or its directors, or provide anything which might have been
originally provided in such articles." The last clause was stressed by the court
as the basis for permitting the above changes. The corporate amendment also
purported to authorize the directors to declare and pay a dividend of $20 per
share of preferred stock to be paid in convertible dividend warrants to be
accepted in discharge of accrued dividends. The court refused to go along with
this and gave the complaining shareholders judgment for their back dividends
in cash. There were three dissenting judges who argued: "Fundamental
changes in contract rights by amendment of a charter are not authorized by
a statute unless such authority is expressly given. Blanket language in a statute
does not authorize such changes." (Fowler, J., dissenting, at p. 585, original
report.) This agrees with Desmond, J., in Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E. 2d 618 (1941): "The individual preferred stock
investor has bargained for certainty in his return, and may not be deprived of
his bargain without express statutory authority." Id. at 506, 35 N.E. 2d at 621.
And: "With regard to the preferential rights here in question the intention of
the Legislature is manifest in its failure expressly to provide that these rights
may be taken away without the consent of each stockholder." Id. at 509,
35 N.E. 2d 622-23.
21
See, for example, the statement by Matthias, J., in Schaffner v. Standard
Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454, 460, 83 N.E. 2d 192, 195 (1948),
quoted at p. 23, this article, and the discussion following it. This view gives a
large measure of stability to the shareholder's contract which, of course, is
important. But it is questionable whether, given circumstances which indicate
that some violence must be done to existing shareholders' rights in order to
save the corporation and with it the various classes of shareholders, creditors
and employees, a formula so drastic is warranted. To obtain new capital, there
may be justification for drastic amendments. But one should not be too naive
about this matter, for in a large number of cases where the difficulty involved
cumulative dividends the amendment contemplated little more than an early
opportunity for the common shareholders to obtain dividends when, if accrued
dividends could not be wiped out, they would have to wait indefinitely for
them. The writer has not found that the Ohio courts have actually taken the
position which Judge Matthias posits in his statement in the Schaffner case.
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more confusion. If specific authority existed for the change authorized by the required percentage of corporate owners, courts, according to their views as to just when the statutory provisions became
a part of the shareholders' contracts, would permit all manner of
change except that which they classified as a change of "vested
property interests." The bulk of recent cases expressing this idea
is composed almost entirely of cases in which the power of amendment has been used to eliminate accrued dividends under the usual
cumulative preferred share contract. The cases arising under the
Delaware statute, since Delaware had taken the position of the
majority of the courts that statutory authorization of corporate
change became a part of the shareholder's contract by virtue of
the reservation of the power to amend or repeal, not depending
upon the time when his stock was acquired but only upon the time
the corporation got its existence, have had much influence when
cases have arisen under other statutes more or less similar. The first
problem arose out of facts which showed that the broad statutory
amendment to Section 26 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law had been enacted subsequent to the formation of the company
and the issue of its shares.22 Taking his cue from an earlier case,2"
Chief Justice Layton, who wrote the opinion, reviewed the leading
cases involving major corporate changes and reached two conclusion: (1) that accumulated dividends on the cumulative preferred
stock were a "fixed and vested right, having the nature and character of a debt" which came under the protection of the due process
clause, and (2) that, "quite apart from the constitutional question involved," Section 26 as amended authorized only amendments to charters and that "the cancellation of cumulative
dividends already accrued through passage of time is not an
amendment of a charter."24 The court stated that there was nothing in the amendment to Section 26 which indicated that it was
the legislative intention to make the act retrospective but clearly
22
Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 At. 115 (1936), reversing
21 Del. Ch. 13, 180 Ad. 584 (1935). Section 26, before and after the amendment to this section, is set forth at pp. 396 and 397 of the opinion. See DEL.
REv. CODE, c. 65, § 2058 (1935), which is § 26.

23

Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696
(1923).

24
Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 411, 413, 190 At. 115, 124,
125 (1936). It is difficult to go along with the court on this. Contra is Harr v.
Pioneer Mechanical Corp. (a Delaware corporation), 65 F. 2d 332 (C.C.A. 2d
1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673, 54 Sup. Ct. 92 (1933) which, of course, under
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938), must follow the
Delaware law. On whether it may perhaps be effective today, see p. 17, this
article. Also contra is McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639
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intimated that had the legislature done so the case would have
been decided the other way. In another dictum, the court stated
that the cumulative dividend preference could be eliminated for
the future by corporate action in accordance with the amendment
to Section 26 which, as has been stated, came after the corporation
was formed and the stock issued. Were it not for the very strong
accent on vested property rights, the case could be passed by as
another instance where the legislature, having failed to delineate
sufficiently its specific intentions, would not be given further aid
by the court in filling out a doubtful area.
Shortly thereafter the Delaware court had before it a case with
just the facts to round out the opinions on the elimination of
accrued dividends by direct amendment. In Consolidated Film
Industries, Inc. v. Johnson,2 the corporation had been formed
after the amendment to Section 26. This time, too, Chief Justice
Layton wrote the opinion-making it doubly clear that the shareholder's right to accrued dividends under his contract was one
which "ought to be regarded as a fixed, contractual right, not to
be diminished or cancelled against his consent, but to be recognized and protected," and that there was nothing in the statute
which indicated that application might be retroactive. Furthermore, he added, "Many interrelations of the State, the corporation, and the shareholders, may be changed. But he, who contends
that the State has conferred a power upon corporations, by charter amendment, to change such a substantial contractual right
as the right to dividends on cumulative preferred stock accrued
under the contract through time, should be able to point to statutory language so clear and precise as to permit of no reasonable
doubt that a retrospective operation was intended."2 8 Thus there
is the inference that had the statute specifically spelled out a retro(D.C. Md. 1939), aft'd, 112 F. 2d 877 (C.C.A. 4th 1940) which concerned a
Maryland statute somewhat different from that of Delaware and, perhaps, can

be reconciled on that basis.
2522 Del. Ch. 407, 197 AtI. 489 (1937), aff'g 22 Del. Ch. 262, 194 AtI. 844

(1937).
26Md. at 416, 197 AtI. at 493. In referring to his opinion in Keller v. Wilson &
Co., Inc., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936), he stated: "In the Keller case, at
the time of the organization of the corporation and the acquirement of the
preferred shares thereof by the complainant, the law did not permit the abrogation of dividends on cumulative preferred shares accrued through passage of
time, and we held that the amendment of 1927 conferred only a power which,
when exercised, enabled a corporation to change the status of shares and rights
of owners thereof speaking from the time of the accomplishment of the appropriate corporate action, but that the language of the amendment did not point
to retrospective operation." Id. at 416, 197 Atl. at 492-93.
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spective application, the court would have permitted the elimination of accrued dividends.27 This, however, is difficult to follow,
for, if his right is a property one, the shareholder must either have
waived it or had it divested by legal due process. That he has
impliedly waived his rights not to have his contract subsequently
impaired is not the same thing as waiving rights which, in some
manner or other, have acquired the label of property-such, for
example, as dividends declared out of a proper fund. If the preference disturbed is not a "vested" property right, then the shareholder's implied agreement backed up by the state's reservation
to amend or repeal corporate charters can be legitimately interpreted, as suggested by Chief Justice Layton, to cover retrospective,
as well as prospective, preferences provided only the legislature
has made this clear.
The difficulty with an analysis which classifies accrued undeclared dividends as a property right different from other contractual
rights of a preferred shareholder has not gone unnoticed in some
recent decisions of importance. The New York Court of Appeals
saw the fallacy of such a distinction in Davison v. Parke, Austin &
Lipscomb2": "So it seems that only confusion results from saying
that 'vested rights' are not within the contemplation of the statute.
All preferential rights of stockholders are in a sense vested. They
are all property rights founded upon contract. The right of priority
in the distribution of corporate assets on dissolution is no less
vested than the right to be paid dividends for past years out of
contingent future profits. The inadequacy of the 'vested rights' test
is further demonstrated by the fact that new stock may be issued
with preferential rights to the assets of the corporation upon dissolution and to dividends superior to the preferential rights of the
then outstanding shares . . . . even superior to the right of preferred stockholders to dividends in arrears . . . . The judicial problem is not whether a particular preferential right is vested or not,
but rather what was the legislative intent as to it." These words
27
See Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D.C. Del. 1943),
where the amendment destroyed the dissolution preference of non-cumulative
preferred shares. Wrote Leahy, Dist. J. (p. 769): "If we must enter the realm
of the implied, then the language of the present Chief Justice of Delaware certainly indicates that if Sec. 26 had specifically authorized the amendment in
the Consolidated Film case, there could be no constitutional objections to such
amendment. I do not think the Delaware courts have left in doubt what position they would take in disposing of the constitutional question in the instant
case."
28285 N.Y. 500, 509, 35 N.E. 2d 618, 622 (1941), Desmond, J., writing the
opinion.
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were later used as a basis for the Supreme Court of the same state
in deciding that the statutory authorization to eliminate accrued
dividends, when taken advantage of by the stated majority of
shareholders in a corporate amendment, may be used to eliminate
dividends already accrued under the preferred shareholder's contract.29 "To characterize dividends, accumulating through lapse
of time, but never declared, as a 'vested' interest is but to argue
from a conclusion," wrote Justice Shientag; and further, "Whenever the court was of the opinion that certain rights of stockholders
could not be interfered with, they characterized those rights as
'vested'.""3 Here, then, is a bald recognition that courts reached
their conclusion by the application of "gastronomic jurisprudence" first and rationalized upon how the conclusion was arrived
at afterward, a feat not unusual in the law and elsewhere, as has
often been demonstrated. 3
But, in most of those jurisdictions recognizing the "vested
interest" theory, the courts were soon pressed with attempts to
avoid its application by several indirect devices which were meant
to strong-arm dissenting shareholders into submission.
A prior preferred stock would, when possible, be authorized
and dividends would be payable first to the new issue. Sufficient
inducements would be given the shareholders of the cumulative
preferred with accrued dividends to assure the success of the plan.
Those who refused to go along with the majority would find themselves holding the old stock but unable to insist upon payment of
their accrued dividends before the new prior preferred shareholders
received theirs.2 Other preferences, such as preferences upon dissolution, might also be given the new prior preferred to make it
29McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 841, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253, 259
(1945).
3
0Id. at 841, 54 N.Y.S. 2d at 259. The present writer recommends that those
who are confused in this matter of the application of reserved powers to later
legislation as applied to corporations formed between the reservation and the

statute study the opinions in the two New York cases (i.e., Davison v. Parke,
Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., and McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane). These opinions
have the clarity which most in this field lack. And see the superb analysis in
BALLANnTNE AND STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAws (1949 ed.),
c. xiv, which indicates that California has the breadth of view of New York and
Delaware but with more protection to minorities.
31
High minded sentiments were sometimes used in supporting the conclusion.
See Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 412, 190 At. 115, 124
(1936).
32

Johnson v. Fuller, 36 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.Pa. 1940); Shanik v. White
Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 154, 15 A. 2d 169 (1940); Johnson v.
Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938). But see Patterson v.
Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
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so attractive (and the old cumulative preferred so undesirable) as
to encourage the "voluntary" exchange.
Another indirect method of eliminating accrued dividends was
to bypass the rigid prohibition against elimination by direct
amendment and to use the merger and consolidation provisions
of the statute. This was sometimes done by merger into a subsidiary
previously formed for other purposes or by the formation of a
subsidiary for the very purpose of merging with it to eliminate
accrued dividends. 3 The shareholder had no choice but to take
stock in the corporation into which the one in which he held shares
with accrued dividends merged. For all practical purposes, the
effect of these indirect methods was to force the dissenting shareholder against his will to give up his stock with its accrued but
undeclared dividends for what was offered him. The same fuss was
not made about vested property interests, though they must exist
as thoroughly in such cases as where direct methods are used to
wipe them out. Had shareholders consented in advance to their
destruction in case of merger or consolidation and not in case of
elimination by direct amendment? It seems doubtful that they
consented here if they did not consent to the elimination by amendment directly destroying their right. As Judge Biggs aptly states
in the Hottenstein case: "If the right is a vested right of property,
protected by constitutional guaranties the holder can be as little
deprived of it by merger or consolidation under Section 59 as by
reclassification under Section 26. If the terms of the contract
between the preferred stockholder and his corporation cannot be
changed by any charter amendment, the preferred stockholder is
entitled to the protection of the Contract Clause, Section 10, Article
1 of the Federal Constitution. If the intervening complainant in
the case at bar is being deprived of a vested right in property in
violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
"3Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940).
Said Layton, C.J., at p. 335, 11 A. 2d at 339: "Consequently, in a case where
a merger of corporations is permitted by the law and is accomplished in accordance with the law, the holder of cumulative preference stock as to which dividends have accumulated may not insist that his right to the dividends is a fixed
contractual right in the nature of a debt, in that sense vested and, therefore,
secure against attack. Looking at the law which is a part of the corporate
charter, and, therefore, a part of the shareholder's contract, he has not been
deceived nor lulled into the belief that the right to such dividends is firm and
stable." See also Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209
(D.C. Del. 1946), aJfd, 163 F. 2d 804 (C.C.A. 3d 1947); Anderson v. International Mineral & Chemical Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E. 2d 573 (1946). In
Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. 2d 944 (C.C.A. 3d 1943), a
corporation was specially created for the purpose of merging one in trouble
with accrued dividends.
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Constitution of the United States, the court below should have
3 4
granted the injunctive relief sought by the appellant." However,
the court was obliged (not reluctantly, it appears, for Judge Biggs
felt that these were not vested property rights) to accept the law
5
as laid down in the Havender case" and bluntly stated that this
decision amounted to a repudiation of the principles laid down
in the Keller"6 and Consolidated Film Industries cases," if "shorn
of rationalization,"'" and that "Havender broke Keller's back,"strong language which seems to mean that this court, at least,
believed that the Delaware decisions would no longer stick to the
"vested property" concept after the holding in Havender.9 Of
course, vested property rights, though constitutionally protected,
may be waived in advance' if a waiver can be shown. But this is
a quite different thing from impliedly consenting to contractual
changes authorized by successive statutory provisions which are
read in.as a part of the shareholder's contract because of the state's
reservation of the power to amend or repeal corporate charters.
Judge Biggs' argument is inherently sound and his conclusions
justified. In fact, when Chief Justice Layton suggests that, were
the statutory provision clear in showing an intent to permit the
elimination of dividends in arrears, an amendment to the articles
to this effect would be respected though it had a retroactive effect,
he impliedly assumes that the so-called vested interest is simply

another contract right of the shareholder, over which the state has
retained its power to change; either this, or that the power to
amend or repeal includes the power to divest property interests,
an argument which has had no acceptance and which should gain
no recognition without showing the shareholder's unequivocal
consent.
From what has been said, it appears that Delaware and New
York, both with broad statutes permitting major corporate change,
are well on their way toward ironing out their constitutional diffi34
Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. 2d 944, 950 (C.C.A.
3d 1943). In the court's note 9, p. 949, it is said: "It is difficult for us to perceive why the right to an unaccrued dividend is any less 'vested' than a right

to a dividend which has accrued."
3524 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940); under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
3
6See note 22 supra.
37See note 25 supra.
38
Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. 2d 944, 950.
39Ibid.
40
Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763, 770 n. 11 (D.C. Del.
1943).
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culties concerning the use of statutory powers as these are granted.
"The prevailing view now is, in Delaware and elsewhere, that the
discretionary power of the controlling or specified majority is
untrammeled by any restriction other than the duty of exercising
good faith."4 There have been from the beginning equitable limitations upon the use of this power by those entrusted with it, of
which more will be said later. But the power itself was held to
be there to apply to corporations formed after the legislative or
constitutional reservation of the power to amend or repeal, whether
or not the particular statute conveying the power to change was
in existence at the time of the formation of the corporation or came
later, whether or not the statute itself imposed the change or a
majority of shareholders were given authority to do so by the
statute, and whether or not the contract could be said to be one
between the state and the corporation or between the shareholder
and his corporation. Frequently, appraisal statutes were pointed to
for the purpose of bolstering the argument above, the legislature
giving the shareholder a means of exit where his interests were in
peril, or as an additional argument to support the constitutionality
of the legislation giving almost unlimited power to majorities to
change the contract relations already existing.
Ohio is one of a still small number of states having an extremely
liberal amendment section.42 By an amendment to Section 8623-14
which became effective on July 24, 1939, the specific power to
eliminate accrued, undeclared cumulative dividends was given. 4
While it had been thought that this section was broad enough before
its amendment to warrant an interpretation that accrued dividends
might be eliminated by shareholder action, 4 Keller v. Wilson &
Co., Inc.4 5' had indicated that a more specific spelling out of the
41

BALLANTINE,

42

CORPORATIONs 656 (Rev. ed. 1946).

Ohio Gen. Code § 8623-14, especially sub-par. (i) which reads:

"... [to]
change any or all of the express terms and provisions or designations of issued
or unissued shares of any class or series; which change, if desired, may include
the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued undeclared cumulative dividends on any such class."
43
The Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Corporations which framed
the provision and was effective in obtaining its enactment took the position
that "in principle there is no distinction between changes of rights to dividends
accrued in the past and changes operative in the future." The Committee also
stated that the then existing § 15 "probably leads to the same result." But
doubts had been raised by virtue of Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567,
15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938). Report on Proposed Amendments to the General Corporation Act, Dec. 16, 1938, of the Ohio State Bar Association on Corporation
Law, comment following § 14.
44See note 43 supra.
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power should be there if a court were to give it retroactive application. Doubt had also been cast in the important case of Johnson
v. Lamprecht,41 which cited the Delaware cases, mentioned the
"vested right" doctrine, but brushed it aside as being "academic"
as the case involved a determination of whether a new class of prior
preferred shares could lawfully be placed ahead of the outstanding
cumulative preferred which had dividend arrearages. Judge Gorman, who wrote the opinion, held the amendment valid-making
the interesting observation that, in case of attempted compulsory
annihilation of accrued dividends, "If there is a surplus, the action
usually has been enjoined. If, on the other hand, there is a need
for additional capital, the corporate necessity for continued existence overshadows the claims of the minority holders to dividends.
In determining the questions courts have considered both the
equities and the business situation, attempted to weigh and balance
them, and then decided the controversy."4 The acceptance of
this view, he thought, could not be upon any basis of a vested
right. The business necessity of the case in hand might well be a
sound basis for decisions in this field, with, of course, a further
requirement of fairness to the shareholders who have to make some
sacrifice.
But the course of decision has not run smoothly since Johnson
v. Lamprecht. In Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co.4" by direct amendment to the articles of incorporation the prescribed majority hoped
to eliminate arrearages in dividends of a corporation formed and
stock issued prior to the effective date of the amendment to Section
14 which, in specific words, permitted such elimination. In a class
action by dissenting shareholders to enjoin the defendants from
carrying out the proposed plan of recapitalization and from paying
dividends on the common stock until all accruals had been fully
paid on the preferred, the trial court held the corporate amendment effective and pointed to Section 72 which afforded the plaintiffs a remedy for the appraisal of their shares as an adequate
remedy. The Court of Appeals held that dividends which had
accrued prior to July 24, 1939, the effective date of the amend4521 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Ati. 115. Likewise, Consolidated Film Industries,
Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 AtI. 489 (1937).
46133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938).
47M.at 574, 15 N.E. 2d at 130. He cites BERLE AND MEANs, Tssx MODER-N
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 150, 151 (1933). These authors were
not talking of retrospective but of prospective action. Nor were they speaking
of undeclared dividends.
48147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
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ment to Section 14, might not be wiped out but that those which
had accrued since that date, up to the time of the amendment
to the articles, could be, "inasmuch as amendments to general corporation laws become a part of the charter of a corporation as of
the day of their promulgation," and that "this section of the corporation code cannot validly have any retrospective or retroactive
effect, but that it may properly and validly be applied prospectively, and this irrespective of when the corporation was organized
or when the stock in question was issued or acquired by the holders
thereof."4 9 Of the removal of dividends which had accrued prior
to July 24, 1939, the court thought that this would be an impairment of the contracts of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court differed with both the trial and appellate courts, holding that the
accrued unpaid dividends were vested rights to the time of the
amendment of the corporate articles and, as no question had been
raised concerning the prospective application of the statutory
amendment, the court refused to give its opinion as to this. Judge
Matthias' opinion, if one may be forgiven for an understatement,
is confusing and far from illuminating. He quotes passages from
American Jurisprudence and Fletcher, which passages state only
the New Jersey, or minority, view on the extent of the reserved
power to amend or repeal. Immediately following the quoted passages, he cites cases from the Supreme Court of the United States
and from Delaware which are clearly basically contra in philosophy to the New Jersey view"0 and which represent the better
and weight of authority, alongside of New Jersey and other cases
expressing the minority, stating as a preamble, "Many cases may
be cited supporting the text, among which are . . ." The facts of

the case quite clearly showed that there was existing at the time
of the proposed corporate amendment a considerable surplus out
of which the corporation, had it decided to, might have paid
4979 Ohio App. 93, 98-99, 72 N.E. 2d 482, 485 (1945), opinion by Stevens,
J. Washburn, J., dissented in part but not on the manner in which new statutory provisions became a part of the shareholders' contracts. The court also
held that the remedy under § 72 was not exclusive "as to such unpaid dividends."
50
See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 648 (Rev. ed. 1946), where he states:
"In a few states, such as Idaho and Utah, a strict view is taken that the effect
of the reserved power is only to allow the state to impose restraints upon existing corporations in the public interest, and not to authorize permissive amendments changing the contract rights of the shareholders among themselves."
See also 1 DAvrEs, 01o CORPORATION LAW 320 et seq. (1942), for a penetrating
analysis of the Ohio and other cases on the extent of the reserved power, and
Bickel, Scope of the Reserved Power to Amend CorporationLaws--Comment on Wheatley
v. A. L Root Co., 19 OHIO B.A.R. 541 (Jan. 6, 1947), where he tries to reconcile
what was held with what was said in this confusing case.
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dividends to the cumulative preferred shareholders, that there was
no compelling necessity to wipe out the accruals, that the benefit
was chiefly to the common shareholders and without the fairness
which is expected in such deals, and all in all had the appearance
of as fine a case as equity might wish for washing unclean hands.
The result of the case was most clearly right, but it could have
been supported by decent, clean-cut reasoning along the line which
previous Ohio cases had been trending, that is, toward the view
expressed in the Court of Appeals that each successive statutory
provision authorizing change was immediately incorporated as a
part of the contract and it did not matter when the shareholder
acquired his shares, whether before the statutory amendment or
after it; he had impliedly consented in advance.51
The Supreme Court complicated matters further by bringing
into the discussion the suggestion that the reserved power constitutional provision does not differ from Section 1, Article II of the
Ohio Constitution, under which authority the General Assembly
has the power to alter or repeal any statute thereafter enacted, and
also by laboring over Section 28, Article II, which prohibits retroactive legislation or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
The answer is clear, for the reservation of the right to amend or
repeal was specifically directed at the corporation, and was aimed
at doing the very violence which the constitution would not permit
without the consent of the corporation and the shareholder. If
Section 28, Article II prohibits the kind of corporate change which
does violence to previously acquired contract rights of shareholders, then the reserved power of Section 2, Article XIII is meaningless. The power to amend or repeal is there and the only immediate
question is whether the narrow and impractical (in a business
sense) view represented by New Jersey be accepted or the broader
and perhaps somewhat more dangerous view of Delaware and
New York be the choice. Then if the court found merit in a
vested interest argument, it could still insist that due process must
be met if the interest is to be divested. As already pointed out,
it is one thing to hold that the power reserved by the state to amend
or repeal must be accepted by the shareholder to include those
charter and statutory provisions existing when the corporation
issued the shares and those charter changes authorized by future
statutes which may, and frequently do, interfere with his former
contractual rights, and quite another thing to hold that, by his
5Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 79 Ohio App. 93, 98-99, 72 N.E. 2d 482, 485
(1945). See also Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 10,
22 N.E. 2d 281, 286 (1939).
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implied waiver, changes may be made which eradicate vested
property interests, whatever these may be.
More fog descended when the recent case of Schaffner v.
Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co.2 emerged from the quiet sanctuary of the Ohio Supreme Court. There is no statement as to
when the corporation was formed, but the shares whose accrued
dividends were receiving annihilation were issued on January 1,
1929. The amendment to the corporate articles had been made
on February 2, 1939, about six months prior to the effective date
of the amendment to Section 14 of the General Corporation Act
which specifically gave the power to annihilate. Here, too, there
was a surplus which might have been used to pay some of the
accrued dividends. Plaintiffs who were holders of shares upon
which dividends had accrued and who refused to turn these shares
in for a new class offered as a part of the recapitalization scheme
brought an action to recover the dividends which had accumulated
and to enjoin the corporation from paying dividends (the record
showed that dividends had already been paid to the common
shareholders) on the common stock until all unpaid cumulative
dividends had been paid on the preferred. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' petition, which judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the
cause being remanded to the trial court "for proceedings in accordance with law." The case next came to the Supreme Court on
motion to certify the record of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court held that "the amendment, effective July 24, 1939,
is not applicable to this case by reason of the fact that the action
of the corporation in recapitalizing was completed on February 2,
1939, which was prior to the effective date of that amendment,""3
that the General Corporation Act of 1927 was applicable, for it
existed at the date of the issue of the shares, but that there were
no provisions "as in effect at that date" which gave a power to
eliminate accrued divdends; hence, they could not be eliminated.
Since dividends had already been paid to the common shares out
of a surplus partially created by the recapitalization, the court
further decreed that the preferred shareholders were entitled to
their dividends "to the extent that such distribution from surplus
was made to holders of the common shares."
Again, the reasoning of the case is more important than the
actual holding. Judge Matthias reverted to the Wheatley case
m150 Ohio St. 454, 83 N.E. 2d 192 (1948).
53
1d. at 461, 83 N.E. 2d at 196.

119491

CORPORATE CHANGES

supra, in these words: "It is to be noted that the shares which
were involved in the Wheatley case were all issued prior to the
General Corporation Act . .

.

which became effective June 9,

1927. The provisions of that act were not applicable to those
shares, and, therefore, Section 8623-14, General Code, granting the
corporation the right to change the terms of outstanding shares
by amendment of the articles of incorporation could not affect
those shares." 4 If he means what he says, no future statute which
interfered with a shareholder's contract as determined by charter
and statutory provisions at the time of the issue of the particular
shares would be valid except with the shareholder's later waiver or,
to a limited extent, by the use of the state's police power. But in
the next paragraph Judge Matthias clearly states that the "reason"
why the amendment to Section 14 could not apply to the Schaffner
case is that the amendment had not become effective at the time
of the recapitalization in February. Quite obviously that cannot
be the "reason" if what he says first is a true statement of the Ohio
law. He later turns to the argument that, while the corporation
might amend its capital structure, such an amendment must not
impair vested rights to receive accrued dividends, then swings into
the retroactivity argument stating that retroactive application of
Section 14 "would constitute an impairment of the constitutional
54Id. at 460, 83 N.E. 2d at 195. But note that Judge Matthias wrote in the
Wheatley case, 147 Ohio St. 127, 145, 69 N.E. 2d 187, 196 (1946): "The provisions of the proposed plan, insofar as they undertake a retroactive application
of these statutory provisions and thus impair the contract of the preferred
shareholders and thereby deprive them of the rights stipulated therein, are
invalid. It should be observed that no question relative to the prospective
application of these statutes is presented, and, therefore, is not considered or
decided." This cannot be reconciled with the quotation to which this note
refers. If Judge Matthias had believed the principle set forth, he should have
said in the Wheatley case, "These shares having been issued prior to the 1927
statute cannot be affected by any provisions in that statute except those which
are non-fundamental in character or in which the state has a vital interest
exercisable by virtue of the police power." Marshall, CJ., in Allen v. Scott,
104 Ohio St. 436, 135 N.E. 683 (1922), with whom Matthias, J., had concurred, saw the fallacy of this argument. The defendants had contended that
they were not subject to the provisions of a statute which placed double liability
upon shareholders of banking corporations for the reason that when they
acquired their shares (and when the corporation was organized) there was no
additional liability. Wrote the then Chief Justice: "The principle contended
for by counsel for defendants in error would immediately create two classes of
corporations, those organized between 1903 and 1913, and those. organized
before and after that period. This would be conducive to the greatest confusion
and would destroy the uniform operation of laws applicable to private corporations." (p. 444) He might also have added that much greater confusion
would result if the time when the shares are issued is the controlling factor.
See also Stockholders of The Peoples Banking Company v. Sterling, Receiver,
300 U.S. 175, 57 Sup. Ct. 386 (1937).
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rights of such shareholders," once more returns to the argument

that "statutes in effect at the time the shares were originally issued
became a part of the contract of the corporation with its shareholders," and again reverts to one that "there is no constitutional
inhibition against the corporation proceeding to amend its capital
structure, except so far as such amendment is sought to be applied
retroactively." 55 But how can this be if later statutory grants of
power may not apply to previous stock issues? The court further
held that the cumulative preferred shareholders were not entitled
to cumulative dividends after the date of the amendment to the
articles (February 2, 1939), that is, those dividends accruing in
the future, thus settling the uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of amendment under Section 14 as it existed before the
amendment of July 24, 1939.
One can only guess at what the court had in mind when it
decided these two important cases. The matter of the retroactive
application of a corporate amendment authorized by a statute
enacted subsequent to the formation of the corporation and that
of vested property rights-whatever that vague term may meanwere points of emphasis not easily dismissed. As a matter of fairness, a rule which limited fundamental corporate amendments to
those which looked to the future and not to the past, except for
emergency action, might have its merits. Likewise, the same result
reached by a rationalization that accrued dividends are vested
property rights indicates the usefulness of this concept to circumvent action by common shareholders bent on plunder. But some
rational basis ought first to be ascertained concerning the nature
of the shareholder's contract with his company, the extent of his
consent under the reserved power, and the necessities of business
carried on in the corporate form. These matters can only be
outlined in this paper, with some indication of the manner of
approach which, of necessity, must be as practical as the complexity
of the problem permits.
First, there is as yet no clear pronouncement from the Supreme
Court of Ohio that it has shifted from the majority Delaware to
the minority New Jersey point of view on the basic problem of
reading into the shareholder's contract successive statutory provisions and the charter amendments empowered by them, though
the dicta of Wheatley and Schaffner are strongly suggestive of the
New Jersey doctrine. The opinions prior in point of time to Wheatley and Schaffner, if read critically, indicate that Ohio had
55150

Ohio St. 454, 461, 83 N.E. 2d 192, 196 (1948).
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accepted the Delaware doctrine and the legislative intent to accept
this same approach is clearly stated in the General Corporation
Act of 1927." Thus, corporations formed before the Constitutional reservation in 1851 of the power to alter or repeal must be
treated in accordance with the principle of the Dartmouth College
case." Those formed after would, by this view, be governed by
statutes then existing or later enacted, which statutes would be
held (by majority holdings) to be a part of the shareholder's contract with his corporation and among his fellow shareholders as
well as between the corporation and the state, with the usual
equitable limitations and subject to the due process clause when
property interests are divested.
Next, it would seem desirable frankly to recognize, as have
some recent opinions, that the ambiguous term "vested property
right" is merely a bit of camouflage to reach a result which can be
more desirably accomplished by other means. As Judge Learned
Hand has stated: "Personally I should not have thought that the
cumulative dividends conferred any 'vested' rights, whatever that
much abused word may mean. They seem to me to be no more
than a right to an increased dividend when any is declared, or at
least when there are earnings.""8

A frank recognition that prefer-

ences are contract rights and nothing more, which the reserved
power to alter or amend may by subsequent legislation seriously
affect, would do much to clarify the law and, at the same time,
would release the court's energies for the important function of
ascertaining whether the proposed amendment has that fairness
which extraordinary power placed in a majority requires.59
56
See 1 DAVIEs, OMO CORPORATION LAW, and Bickel, op. cit. supra note 50
for analyses of the Ohio cases; 6 OHio ST. LJ. 313 (1940). On legislative

intent, see Ohio Gen. Code §§ 8623-14, -130, -131, -135.
57

For an excellent recent case, see New Orphans' Asylum of Colored Children
of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219, 80 N.E. 2d 761 (1948).
The doctrine of that case is recognized in Ohio in § 8623-130: "Corporations created before the adoption of the constitution of 1851, which have not,
by election or some other act, come to be governed by laws since passed, shall
be governed and controlled by the laws then in force, and the valid modifications thereof since and herein enacted." Such a corporation may, however, be
governed by the provisions of the General Corporation Act if it accepts the
same in the manner set out in Ohio Gen. Code. § 8623-131, or by other corporate action described in this section.
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Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. 2d 332, 336 (C.C.A. 2d 1933).

See also quotation from Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, p. 14 of this
article and Justice Shientag's statement in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane,
quoted at p. 15.
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There is perhaps no better general statement on the matter of fairness than
the following: "The reserved power of the corporation to amend its charter
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While the judicial approach in the determination of "fairness"
has varied and the statutes give little aid in solving this problem,6"
a satisfactory solution rests in the broad powers of the chancellor
to prevent inequitable results. 6' Equitable limitations on the power
of a majority may be, as some have claimed, "of such an indefinite
and nebulous character that they fail to provide the stockholder
with anything approaching an adequate remedy against tendencies
of a management to overreach," 62 but there is no good reason
why able judges without the aid of additional legislation cannot
remedy this matter.6 3 If, as Professor Ballantine has stated, "In
general.. . , except in New Jersey, the courts have not undertaken
to review the question of unfairness of amendments even in a case
must be so exercised that the result will tend to benefit the corporation as a
whole, and to distribute equitably the benefit or the sacrifice, as the case may
be, between all groups in the corporation as their interests may appear."
BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 267
(1932).
60Class voting is frequently required and generally the amendment must be
carried by more than a simple majority. See Ohio Gen. Code § 8623-15(4).
The Ohio statute raises a presumption that the amendment is "fair and equitable in every respect to all shareholders" and requires "clear and convincing
proof" to overcome the presumption. Ohio Gen. Code § 8623-15(9). By § 862314, the shareholder, if substantially prejudiced by the amendment, or even
though not prejudiced in the cases stated, has his remedy of appraisal and
payment under § 8623-72.
"In a few states, as in California, a permit from the Commissioner of Corporations is required for the adoption of an amendment making changes in outstanding shares under the Corporate Securities Act as such amendments operate as the substitution of a new security for the old." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 656-57 (Rev. ed. 1946).
61
"There also exists the inherent power of a court of equity, a power limited
generally to the test of good faith rather than a test objective in character, a
power the exercise of which may be circumscribed, because too often what is
an accomplished fact is presented to the court; but it is a significant, restraining
influence nevertheless. [Citations omitted.]" Shientag, J., in McNaulty v.
W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 844-45, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253, 262 (1945).
See the excellent analysis of the New Jersey and Delaware cases on this important matter in Meck, Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks, 55
HARV. L. REv. 71, 95-112 (1941). The author demonstrates that the New
Jersey rule of fairness in accrued dividend adjustments "seems to revolve

about the existence of an earned surplus" at the date of the proposed adjustment.
62
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel
and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part VII, Management Plans Without Aid of Committees (May 10, 1938), at p. 525.
63"A judge who understands the realities of the situation need have no hesitation in treating recapitalization plans as in fact what the SEC has called them,
"management plans", and not arm's-length bargains between independent
groups of common and preferred shareholders. So treating them, he should
have no difficulty in holding that it is within the power of an equity court, even
in the absence of specific legislation, to subject them to the same sort of objective test of fairness to which reorganization plans are now subjected." Dodd,
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of substantial prejudice, short of fraud," the day has come for
a return to a more refined conscience on the part of the chancellor,
a return to the techniques of Lord Mansfield. The day of majority
piracy as well as of minority oppression is in its sunset. As a measuring stick for the chancellor, this statement may well suffice:
"Changes in the rights of outstanding shares may be valid if they
can be justified as an exercise of fair business discretion in meeting
the needs and exigencies of the corporate enterprise. The more
urgent the need or the emergency the more drastic the amendment
or adjustment which fairness will permit, as in changing preferences and financial arrangements according to what the enterprise
can carry. The facts and circumstances of each case will enter
into the determination of the validity of the exercise of the power
in that case." 65 If guidance of a more definite sort is desired
the chancellor may go to the reorganization field for analogies or
for a measuring stick with which to test recapitalization amendments. 6 Once it is made clear that recapitalization must not only
be done in good faith but also that there is a higher standard than
unfairness indicating "fraud", there will at least be the threat that
fair and equitable standards must be met in recapitalization by
both direct and indirect methods. If the chancellor fails in this the
legislature should take over and prescribe that there be prior
judicial consent to recapitalization amendments or provide some
sort of administrative action to enforce just recapitalizations.

Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 780, 806 (1942). And,
later, at p. 817, Professor Dodd states: "Fortunately, however, no case has
definitely foreclosed the chance to contend successfully that the problem of
recapitalization is essentially the same as that of reorganization, and that the
state courts should prevent the enrichment of common shareholders in recapitalizations at the expense of the preferred, just as the federal courts prevent
the enrichment of junior interests in Chapter X reorganizations."
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BALLANTINE, COR'ORATIONs 656 (Rev. ed. 1946).
65
Quoted with approval from BALLANTm AN STERLING, CALIORNIA CORPORATION LAws 9 (1938), by Marks, J., in De Mello v. Dairyman's Co-opera-

tive Creamery, 73 Cal. App. 746, 751, 167 P. 2d 226, 228 (1946), appellant's
petition for a hearing in the Supreme Court being denied May 27, 1946.
66See Dodd, supra note 63, at 769 et seq., particularly his analyses of the recapitalizations in Keller v. Wilson & Co., Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v"
Johnson, Federal United Corp. v. Havender and Shanik v. White Sewing
Machine Corp., and the application of the reorganization test to these cases.
Professor Dodd reaches the conclusion that "the facts of these four Delaware
cases indicate sufficient doubt as to the fairness of the plans to the preferred
shareholders to suggest the need for subjecting reclassification plans to a
different sort of scrutiny than they now receive." And see Latty, FairnessThe Focal Point in Preferred Stock ArrearageElimination, 29 VA. L. R. v.1 (1942)
for a comparable analysis and his conclusions from p. 49 to p. 51. These articles
offer much to judges who would see the true picture of what so often happens
in recapitalization through shareholder action.

